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TN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLARD Y. :\IORRIS, Executor of 
the Estate of \Villiam Shields, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
TED RUSSELL and ~fANILA RUS-
SELL, his wife, 
Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 7630 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against the de-
fendants (appellants) in the amount of $4,500.00 based 
upon verdict of a jury (R. 16) in a case brought to 
recover money for personal services rendered by William 
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Shields, now deceased, to the appellants both on the 
theory of an express contract and on the theory of 
quantum meruit. William Shields, now deceased, will 
be referred to as plaintiff, and the executor of his estate 
as respondent. The pages of the record will be referred 
to in parentheses with no other designation. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
The amended complaint of the plaintiff, William 
Shields, (1 & 2) alleges that plaintiff performed serv-
ices for the defendants at their special instance and re-
quest from June, 1943, to August, 1949, and that appel-
lants agreed to pay the plaintiff $100.00 per month and 
room and board, of which no part had been paid except 
$180.00, leaving a balance owing of $7,220.00. As an 
alternative cause of action plaintiff alleged the same 
services of the reasonable value of $150.00 per month but 
without the express contract and sought judgment in the 
same sum. 
The amended answer ( 3 & 4) denies generally the 
allegations in the first cause of action and in answering 
the alternative cause of action alleges the contract be-
tween appellants and the plaintiff in which the plaintiff 
was to perform services and have his room and board 
with no cash payment nor settlement of any kind or 
nature; and that the plaintiff had been paid in full ac-
cording to the contract. The amended answer also set 
up t~e bar of Section 104-a-23 U.C.A. 1943, a statute 
of limitations limiting suit to four years (R. 4). This 
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"·ould bar reeoyery for ~erYirP~ prior to February 23, 
1946. 
The rase wa~ tried before a jury and at the close 
of the plaintiff'~ ca~e the appellants n1oved for non-suit 
or the disn1i~sal of the plaintiff's case for failure of proof 
as to each count ~eparately, whieh nwtion as to the sec-
ond count wa~ sustained and the alternative count on 
quanhun nwruit was stril'ken (1:2G). 
The appellants put on their case following which 
the plaintiff moved for reinstate1nent of the second cause 
of action, whereupon the Court vacated its ruling made 
at the close of plaintiff's testimony, overruled the said 
motion of the appellants and thereby reinstated the 
second cause of action ( 255) . 
William Shields, the plaintiff and respondent, testi-
fied that he was sixty years old ( -1-7); that he became ac-
quainted with the appellants in 1941 when he was look-
ing for work ( 48) and went to work for them for board 
and room and small wages ( 49) in exchange for which 
he took care of the chickens, one cow and some pigs ( 49). 
He also did some garden work and received from the 
appellants a little money for clothes, rnedical expenses, 
etc. (50). In the summer of 1943 the appellants acquired 
a motor court and plaintiff entered into an agree1nent 
with them to work for thern for big wages, which was 
not made definite at that tirne but later was fixed at 
"about $100.00 a month, board and room," which con-
versation took place after appellants had moved to their 
motor court (51). Nothing was said as to when the 
money would he paid ( 5:?). Plaintiff's duties included 
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Inaking beds, scrubbing, mopping, painting, keeping the 
place clean and collecting rents (52). He also dug a 
sewer trench, took out the garbage, shoveled snow (53); 
also did some work on the sewer line for a Mr. Weedon 
for which he received $17.00, approximately (57). On 
several occasions, the appellants left the motor court 
in the care of plaintiff while they took a trip (60). 
During none of the time did plaintiff receive $100.00 
a month from appellants, but he did receive his board 
and room, although at times he got his own meals (63). 
For a time respondent worked for a rock wool concern 
about one-half day each week until he earned $50.00 in 
cash which he kept, (63) and at this time he quit and 
rented a room in town, but at the request of appellants 
came back after a day or two ( 64). The job at the rock 
wool place was obtained for plaintiff by the appellants 
( 65). During all of the time plaintiff worked for appel-
lants, he received from them approximately $180.00 in-
cluding the $50.00 from the rock wool company for which 
he gave them credit (65 and 66). Plaintiff didn't need 
the money and testified that he figured when appellants 
got ready to sell or got through with him they would pay 
him and in the meantime he lived on the little money 
he received and tips he got for deliveries of ice to the 
guests (67). Plaintiff didn't ask for the $100.00 a month 
because he thought the appellants would pay him and he 
knew they needed the money on their auto court. He 
intended to get the money at the time he quit his employ-
ment (67). 
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Plaintiff left the e1nploy of appellants at one other 
time and got a job at the Labor Temple which required 
payment of union dues of $20.00, and when he asked the 
appellants for the Inoney they talked him out of taking 
the job because the work was too hard (69-70) and an-
other reason for not taking the job was that there was 
no place to board out on the salt flats where the job was 
(70). Plaintiff finally left the employ of appellants about 
August, 1949 (7:2). 
The conversation about receiving $100.00 a month 
took place after ~Ir. Weedon had finished a sewage job 
and Mr. Weedon took about three years on the sewage 
job (89 and 90). 
It was in the summer of 1947 that respondent quit 
his job with appellants and took a room in town, plan-
ning to go to Denver (94). Respondent made no demand 
on appellants for money for wages when he quit in 194 7 
(95). 
On redirect exa1nination the plaintiff testified that 
the figure of $100.00 and board and room was established 
within a day or two after he first Inoved to the tourist 
court with appellants (105). And plaintiff further testi-
fied that he did not quit the employ of the appellants 
when he inquired about the job at the salt works (106) 
but he did quit in 1947 when he had an argument with 
the appellants over the $50.00 (107), and after quitting 
that time he came back to work for appellants at the 
same wages (107). 
Ted Russell testified for appellants that he and 1\tfrs. 
Russell owned the State Tourist Court at 3114 South 
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State in Salt Lake County and have been acquainted with 
William Shields since 1941 ( 14 7). Shields was sent to 
them by the Salvation Army and said he had experience 
in far1ning and was willing to work for them for room 
and board; that Russell advised Shields that "as far as 
wages are concerned you may as well not come up be-
cause I couldn't pay that" (149). Russell introduced 
Shields to Mrs. Russell and they then told him that if 
he would help them they would give him board and room 
and incidentals, "like clothes and smoking money," which 
Shields agreed to with appellants (149). This arrange-
Inent continued until July, 1943, when they moved to the 
South State Tourist Court (150). 
Just before moving to the tourist court appellants 
had a conversation with plaintiff in which they told him 
they were moving to the tourist court and if he wanted to 
go along under the same conditions to be yard man and 
to clean snow, take away the garbage, clean up around 
the front, pick up papers and help Russell out occasion-
ally when needed he could come along. Plaintiff said, 
"Give me a day and I will think it over." And on the next 
day Russell asked plaintiff for his decision and Shields 
said, "I can't get no work anywhere now, I haven't got 
anything else to do, and I haven't got no money to go, 
so if it's agreeable with you and Mrs. Russell I will 
carry on the way I am, if it is agreeable with you. If it 
isn't, I will have to get out." (150-151). On July 15, 1943, 
they moved to the tourist court and Shields continued to 
work there and did not at any time demand any money )~ 
from appellants except an occasional quarter for to-
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bacco (1:11). He didn't demand any wag<'~ lweau~P he 
knew what the agreernent was and that he was entitled 
to no wages (15:2). 
At the tourist court plaintiff was neYer left in charge 
of the n1otor court and wa~ never given the care of the 
cabins such at' changing the linen, n1opping and sweep-
ing and so on for which purposes other persons were 
en1ployed ( 153). Plaintiff was not a skilled workman and 
could not be entrusted with Inany tools, as the breakage 
he would cause wa~ nwre expensive than the value of the 
work done ( 15-!). 
'Vhen a ~I r. 'Yeedon took a contract on five cabins 
the appellants released plaintiff to work for Weedon 
and he earned $320.00 under the agreement with Weedon, 
but 'Yeedon paid him only $47.00 (154-155). 
When appellants were doing some other remodeling 
Russell arranged to have plaintiff employed as a car-
penter and introduced in evidence Exhibit 1 to show two 
weeks work at $82.50 a week, which Shields received 
(157). 
Two or three times plaintiff con1plained about his 
work and Russell told him he was free to go anytime he 
wanted to and at one time offered to take hirn over to 
Wendover to work in the salt n1ines. vVhen plaintiff 
wanted to stay in the motor court and drive to and from 
Wendover, Russell told him it was too far to drive to 
and from work (157-158). Appellants also permitted 
Shields to take side jobs such as feeding chickens for 
1\like Dragos, a neighbor, and doing the work for the 
rock wool man ( 159). 
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In 1946 plaintiff quit once when Russell and his wife 
had an argument about whether Mrs. Russell was supply-
ing Shields with money. Plaintiff got sore and quit and 
went away for three or four days but came back and 
said he had spent the money he had on a drunk and 
Russell said that if he wanted to come back under the 
san1e arrangements as before he could, and he went 
back to his cabin and continued until July or August, 
1949 (161-162). 
Plaintiff quit for about three days on the occasion 
when he said he intended to go to Denver and that prob-
ably was in the fall or toward the end of the summer 
in 1947 (164, 165). 
Shields many times told appellant Russell that he 
was a man of substantial property interests; that he had 
a 240 acre farm in Oregon, owned a V3 interest in 
Catalina Islands and that the city of Seymour, Indiana, 
was paying him rental on the city, which city has a popu-
lation of 130,000 people (168), and so far as appellant 
knows Shields never received any money from any of 
those sources (168-169). 
Shields smoked a lot and Russell furnished him 
money to buy tobacco, but Shields never made any de-
mand for $100.00-a-month wages. On one occasion, 
Shields asked Russell to take him back to Oregon and 
said that if he could get to Oregon, he could make out 
for himself (171-172). 
During this time skilled work to repair and improve 
the motor court was hired and paid for by appellants as 
shown by the receipts and invoices and statements con-
tained in Exhibit 2 (172-180). 
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Appellanb also supplied ~hields with either nwney 
for clothing or with elothing and took care of him when 
he was sick ( 181). 
When the appellants and plaintiff 1noved into the 
tourist court, it was understood that plaintiff was to have 
his board and roon1 and tobacco 1noney and there was no 
conversation about paying Shields $100.00, besides board 
and room (183). It was in February of 1948 that Shields 
was employed as a carpenter for two weeks at $82.50 per 
week as shown on Exhibit 1 ( 188). The argument be-
tween appellants over the money which plaintiff had, 
totaling a smn of $50.00, was not because Mrs. Russell 
had paid wages to plaintiff but because Russell suspected 
that his wife had given hin1 too much money from time 
to time and that Shields had accumulated $50.00 or $60.00 
(190). 
Russell estimated that plaintiff received the equiva-
lent of $145.00 to $165.00 per month, represented by the 
value of board and room, tobacco, clothes and everything, 
of which about $50.00 would be board and room, ( 191) 
and at different times he aYeraged it up to equal approxi-
mately $120.00 per month (192). The Social Security 
Taxes paid by Russell on Shields' e1nployment was at 
the rate of $50.00 per month and Russell paid both his 
tax and Shields' tax (192). 
William Carlaw testified that he and Mrs. Carlaw 
have lived at the State Tourist Court for eight years 
and have known Mr. Shields while they have been there, 
and that many times when the Russells went away they 
left Mrs. Car law in charge of the motor court ( 205, 206). 
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Shields claims to have been in charge of the motor court 
at times, but he never was, so far as Carlaw knows, 
as his wife was always left to take care of it (209). 
Clarence Rodda testified that he has lived at the 
State Tourist Court for six or seven years and has known 
plaintiff there, and that in conversation with Mr. Shield~, 
Shields has said he wasn't making any money there but 
only his board and room, and he would like to get out and 
get a job (219-220). 
llfrs. Manila Russell testified that she became ac-
quainted with !1r. Shields in 1941 when they got him 
from the Salvation Army, and that he worked on the 
farm for a while until they moved to the State Tourist 
Court in 1943 ( 222-223). Shields took his meals with the 
Russells and ate right at the table with their family. 
Mrs. Russell made no arrangements with Shields about 
wages, just told him that if he would like to come to the 
tourist court with them it would be all right (224). The 
arrangements for Shields' employment were made by 
Mr. Russell through the Salvation Army and there was 
no arrangement for $100.00 a month, and the only money 
he received was when it was given to him by Mr. or Mrs. 
Russell to buy clothes or to permit him to keep change 
after going to the store, and he never asked for wages 
at the rate of $100.00 per month (227). Shields also did 
an ice business by buying ice a block away and deliver-
ing it to each of the tenants. His business was good 
enough that the ice company brought a little wagon out 
and put it in front of the tourist court for Shields' con-
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venience (~:2S). Rut plaintiff said it would be too nmch 
work to fix it up so the iee eompany took it back (228). 
The mon~y which ~[rs. Russell gave to Shields was 
out of generosity and not because h~ had wages eoming 
to him (233). It would probably anwunt to $10.00 per 
1nonth between money and clothing provided for hirn 
( 23-1). 
~\ t the elo~t? of the testirnony, the plaintiff moved 
that the second cause of action which had theretofore 
been stricken be reinstated, whereupon the Court vacated 
its ruling and reinstated the second cause of action (255). 
The Court instructed the jury that the case in-
volved parts of the years 1943 and 1949 and all of the 
years 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 (5 & 9) and in-
structed the jury that the case was submitted on alter-
native theories; one, an express contract and the other 
an implied contract, and that under the express contract 
there were two possibilities; one, that the contract was 
for board and room and $100.00 per month, and the other, 
that the contract was for board and room and incidentals 
only (8 & 9). 
Appellants excepted to instructions 1, 4, 5, and 8, and 
particularly to references of the court in its instructions 
to all of the years 1944, 1945, 1946, 194 7 and 1948. Also 
to instruction No. 4 in referring to the possibility of 
either an express or an implied contract, and to refer-
ence in the instructions to the reasonable value of serv-
ices rendered (257). 
The jury verdict was in favor of the plaintiff for 
$4,500.00 (16). 
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Appellants' motion for a new trial alleged error in 
instructions to the jury, in excluding instructions prayed 
for by appellants, also in permitting the quantum mer-
uit count to go before the jury, and further on the 
grounds of misconduct of the jury in determination of 
the verdjd by chance. This motion for new trial was 
based upon the grounds also that respondent was under 
a legal guardianship when the suit was instituted and 
was incompetent to sue and also that the respondent was 
incompetent ( 17 & 18). This motion was denied N ovem-
ber 17, 1950 ( 21). In the meantime Shields died and his 
administrator was substituted as party plaintiff. 
With reference to the first motion to strike, respond-
ent filed counter affidavits showing that the jurors had 
each placed a figure on a slip of paper. The figures had 
been totaled and divided by the number of jurors and 
that figure was used as the beginning point for the de-
liberations as to the amount of verdict to which respond-
ent was entitled (S-2 to S-6). 
Thereafter, and on December 11, 1950, a further mo-
tion for a new trial and for reconsideration of the error 
in ruling was filed in which further facts were alleged 
with reference to plaintiff's insanity and letters from 
the superintendent of a mental hospital at Pendleton, 
Oregon, were attached to the motion in which the opinion 
is expressed that Shields, having escaped the hospital 
on August 11, 1941, had the type of insanity recovery 
from which was improbable. (22-26). This motion was 
denied on December 15, 1950. 
Respondent filed a motion to strike the second mo-
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" 
tion of the appellant~ for new trial alleging that the evi-
dence as to insanity was not newly discovered (32, 33) . 
• \ppellant~ filed a statement of points on appeal in 
the District Court (35-36). 
STATE~IEXT OF POIXTS RELIED ON 
POIXT I 
SINCE THE PLEADINGS AND THE EVIDENCE OF 
BOTH PARTIES ESTABLISH AN EXPRESS CONTRACT, 
IT WAS ERROR TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON 
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
POIXT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO VACATE ITS 
JUDGMENT OF INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL MADE FOL-
LOWING THE CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO 
AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO FEBRU-
ARY 23, 1946, UNDER SECTION 104-2-23 U. C. A. 1943. 
POINT I\~ 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND PRE-
SUMED INSANITY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THE PLEADINGS AND THE EVIDENCE OF 
BOTH PARTIES ESTABLISH AN EXPRESS CONTRACT, 
IT WAS ERROR TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON 
THE THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The amended complaint in paragraph 2 and 3 of 
the first cause of action definitely alleges an express 
agreement to pay for plaintiff's services $10.00 per month 
and room and board ( 1). The amended answer denies 
these allegations and then proceeds to allege in para-
graph 5 that there was a specific agreement for plain-
tiff's services as watchman and handy man "for which 
the defendants agreed to furnish the plaintiff a cabin to 
live in and his board during the period that the plaintiff 
was so employed, it being expressly understood that 
plaintiff was free to leave at any time and that he was 
to receive no cash payment nor settlement of any kind or 
nature; that the plaintiff agreed to the terms of such 
arrangement * * *" ( 3-4). 
The plaintiff testified that in the summer of 1943 
he entered into an agreement with respondents to work 
for them for wages of $100.00 a month and board and 
room, which conversation took place after they had 
moved to their motor court (51) although nothing was 
said as to when the money would be paid (52). 
The appellant Russell also testified that an agree-
ment was made with the plaintiff shortly after they 
moved to their motor court. He spoke to the plaintiff 
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about it. The plaintiff a~ked for a day to think it over 
and the next day advised appellants, "I can't get no work 
anywhere now, I haven't got anything else to do, and I 
haven't got no nwney to go, so if it is agreeable with you 
and ~Irs. Russell I "'ill carry on the way I atn" (150-151). 
He thereby continued the agreement he had had with the 
appellants while they still lived on their farn1 which was 
also an agree1nent for serviees in exchange for board and 
roon1 and incidentals (149). The appellant ~Irs. :Manila 
Russell confirn1ed this agreen1ent ( ~~-±). 
It thus appears that both by the pleadings and 
testiinony the parties established that there was an ex-
press agreement for plaintiff's services and the point of 
difference and actually the issue of the evidence in this 
law suit was whether the agreement was for board and 
room and incidental n1oneys or for board and room and 
$100.00 per month. 
A comparable situation was involved in Millar v. 
Macey Company, 263 :Mich. -!8-!-, 248, N.\V. 879, in which 
the plaintiff sued for the value of services rendered in 
the first cause of action on the cmnmon counts and in 
the second cause of action under an express contract for 
a commission on all sales at a specific percentage. The 
defendant denied any indebtedness on the common counts 
and in answer to the allegations of express contract de-
nied that the contract was as pleaded between plaintiff 
and alleged that if there was a contract, it was for com-
missions on the sale of certain lines of products only. 
At the trial testimony on the cmmnon counts was at 
first held inadmissable and later received on the theory 
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that if plaintiff failed to establish his contract he might 
still recover on common counts. The plaintiff recovered 
a judgment and the defendant appealed. On the question 
of whether evidence should have been received on both 
theories the court held : 
"The law in this state seems to be well settled 
that where an express contract is entered into be-
tween parties, but they differ as to the terms 
thereof, and there is evidence tending to support 
the claim of each of them, it is for the jury to 
determine what the terms of the contract were 
and there can be no recovery on the quantum 
meruit. In Swarthout v. Lucas, 101 Mich. 609, 
612, 60 N.W. 306, 307, it was said: 'There was 
no room for the jury to find an implied contract, 
each claimed an express contract, and the sole 
questionable fact was, which was the correct 
one f" 
The court reversed the judgment of the trial court 
and ordered a new trial holding that the evidence in sup-
port of quantum meruit might have influenced the jury 
and been reflected in the verdict. Other Michigan cases 
to the same general effect are Schurr v. Savagny, 85 
Mich. 144,48 N.W. 547; Shaw v. Armstrong, 88 Mich. 311, 
50 N.W. 248; Ruttle v. Foss, 161 Mich. 132, 125 N.W. 790. 
These cases were cited in Millar v. Macey. 
Other cases holding that where an express contract 
is sued on recovery on the theory of quantum meruit is 
not obtainable are Greif v. B. L. B. Motor Repair Com-
pany, 182 N.Y.S. 765; Brown v. Wrightsman, 176 Okla. 
189, 51 Pac. 2d 761. 
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The san1e rule approached from n different point of 
view is stated in TVilliston on Contracts, Revised Edi-
tion, Section 1-l-59 and Restatement of the Lau' of Con-
tracts, ~ertion 350. The restatement ~a~T~: 
"'The remedy of re~titution in money is not 
available to one who has fully perforn1ed his part 
of a contract, if the only part of the agreed ex-
change for such perforn1ance that has not been 
rendered by the defendant is a sum of money con-
stituting a liquidated debt." 
This is the sarne rule stated by vVilliston at the place 
indicated. 
rnder the facts of the case at bar, Shields the plain-
tiff had performed his contract in full and there re-
mained only for him to recover the money constituting 
performance on the part of the appellants. This is not 
a proper action on quantum meruit, but must be an ac-
tion on the contract which was pleaded and proved and 
admitted by the appellants but with a difference of opin-
ion as to what the rate of pay was. 
A recent Utah case is cited because it probably 
should be distinguished from the case at bar. In Young 
v. Hansen (Utah, May, 1950) 218 Pac. 2d 666, this court 
allowed recovery on the theory of quantum meruit where 
the plaintiff had sued to recover on a contract which 
had been partially performed. The court observed that 
the defendant would not be allowed to retain the property 
which was to be operated by the parties under the agree-
ment pleaded as well as the money whirh the plaintiff 
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had paid to the defendant because this would result in 
unjust enrichment to the defendant. For this reason 
the court permitted a recovery on the theory of quantum 
meruit although it had not been specially pleaded. This 
is the very point made in Will is ton and the Restate-
ment of Contracts at the places cited. Where full per-
formance is given the only recovery is under the con-
tract; but where an agreement has been partially per-
formed, it is proper to bring a suit for the value of the 
services rendered and it was this rule which this court 
recognized in Young v. Hansen and recognized it even 
though there had been no specific pleading of quantum 
meruit. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO VACATE ITS 
JUDGMENT OF INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL MADE FOL-
LOWING THE CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the appellants 
moved for a nonsuit or dismissal of the plaintiff's case 
for the reasons that plaintiff had not sustained proof 
of the elements that go to make up the cause of action 
stated and the motion was made separately as to the two 
counts and particularly as to the first count but directed 
also to the second count. The court denied the motion as 
to the first count and said : 
"At the present state of the record, I am 
inclined to grant the motion as it pertains to the 
second count." Whereupon counsel asked, "The 
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entire quantum meruit i~ ~triek<>n f' And the eourt 
replied, .. Y e~ '' ( 1:2()), and then said, "'rhe nwtion 
for a nonsuit, so far as it pertains to the second 
count, is granted. You may lirnit your defense, 
:\Ir. Burnham, to nmtters allef!;ed under the first 
count. under an expre~s rontraet.'' (1:27). 
And then, after the appellants had put on their de-
fense under the court's ruling that the quanturn meruit 
count was out of the case, counsel for the plaintiff moved 
that the second cause of action be reinstated for the 
reason that the grounds stated by the court were im-
proper there being sufficient evidence of the value of 
the services rendered by the plaintiff to enable the jury 
to decide the case. Thereupon the court replied: "I am 
going to vacate my ruling made at the close of the plain-
tiff's testimony for a nonsuit, upon the second count, 
and now I will overrule the motion." ( 255). 
This reversal of the court's ruling and reinstatement 
of the second count was specially made a basis for motion 
of new trial, the motion assigning also. error in giving 
instructions on this point to the jury ( 17). 
Under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a dismissal of an action at the close of the plaintiff's 
evidence is said to be an involuntary dismissal, and "Un-
less the court in its order for dismissal otherwise speci-
fies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as 
an adjudication upon the rnerits." 
This court held in Robinson 1;. Salt Lake City, 39 
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Utah 580, 109 Pac. 817 with reference to the granting 
of a nonsuit: 
"If a motion is granted, the only judgment 
that is permissable is one dismissing the action; 
that i~, one which arrests any further proceeding 
in that action except on appeal. Such judgment 
is not a bar to a future action on the same cause 
of action, and cannot be pleaded as such." 
The difference between that case and the present rule of 
civil procedure is that a dismissal such as was made in 
the case at bar at the close of plaintiff's evidence is a 
dismissal on the merits and would, therefore, go beyond 
the ruling of the court in the Robinson case. 
And in Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah 
County, 80 Utah 491, 15 Pac. 2d 633 the court granted 
a nonsuit upon which findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were made and a judgment was entered. On appeal 
of this case this court said : 
"We are at a loss to understand why the 
court handled this case in this manner, because, 
upon granting of a motion for nonsuit, the court 
thereupon divested itself of the power to do more 
than enter judgment of dismissal, or upon mo-
tion for new trial to grant a new trial or to deny 
the motion." 
A quite similar situation was before the court in 
DiGregorio v. Skinner, 351 Penn. 441, 41 Atl. 2d 649, 
where at the close of the plaintiff's case the court granted 
a motion for nonsuit against one of the defendants and 
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then after th~ defendant had put on his case, it appear-
ing to the court that the ruling had been erroneous and 
that there was some possibility that the defendant dis-
missed out of the ease should have been held, set aside 
the nonsuit and granted a new trial as to both defend-
ants. As to this 1natter the Supre1ne Court stated: 
44 The trial court was convinced that justice re-
quired that defendants, .Jlrs. Daniels and Burg, be 
given an eliual opportunity to show for whom 
Skinner acted at the time of the accident. To do 
this it was neces~;ary to grant a new trial to Burg 
and take off a nonsuit entered as to l\lrs. Daniels." 
It thus appears frmn these authorities that if the 
trial judge believed he had committed error in granting 
the involuntary dismissal of the second count the only 
jurisdiction in the trial court was to grant or deny a mo-
tion for new trial. It is difficult to perceive how the court 
could regard it as a fair ruling to reinstate the quantum 
meruit count and submit that count to the jury after 
ordering the appellants to try their case on the theory 
that the quantu1n meruit count was out of the case. It 
is hard to see how any situation could be more prejudi-
cial to a litigant than this one. Regardless, therefore, 
of the question of jurisdiction it is submitted that the 
motion for new trial on this assigned error should have 
been granted so that appellants could offer their proof 
on the issue of quantum meruit before the jury shall have 
that theory given to then1. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO 
AWARD DAMAGES FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO FEBRU-
ARY 23, 1946, UNDER SECTION 104-2-23 U. C. A. 1943. 
This section of the statute of limitations provides 
that an action must be commenced within four years 
upon "An action upon a contract, obligation or liability 
not founded upon an instrument in writing * * * also, on 
an open account for work, labor or services rendered, 
or materials furnished * * * ." The last portion of this 
quotation has been included to anticipate the argument 
of respondent that the matter sued on in this case was 
an open account. This seems to be answered by Bishop 
v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 Pac. 2d 180, where this 
court was construing this same statute as applicable to a 
claim for services by an attorney against a corporation 
and rendered over a period of some nine and one-half 
years. The court quoted from a decision of the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Spencer v. Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234 
Pac. 972 at 973, 39 A.L.R. 365, the following definition: 
"A 1nutual, open, current account may be de-
fined as an account usually and properly kept in 
writing wherein are set down by express or im-
plied agreement of the parties concerned a con-
nected series of debit and credit entries of reci-
procal charges and allowances, and where the 
parties intend that the individual items of the 
account shall not be considered independently, 
but as a continuation of a related series, and that 
the account shall be kept open and subject to a 
shifting balance as additional related entries of 
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debits or credit~ nre nmde thereto, until it shall 
suit the convenience of either party to settle and 
close the account, and where pursuant to the ori-
ginal, e~qn·p~~. or iluplied intention there is but 
one single and indivisible liability arising frmn 
such series of related and reciprocal debits and 
credits, wh:ch liability is to be fixed on the one 
part of the other as the balance shall indicate at 
the tin1e of settleruent or following the last per-
tinent entry of the account." 
It is quite· apparent that the particularity required of 
an open account under this definition was not present 
in the case at bar and that the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion must therefore succeed if at all as an action upon 
a contract not founded upon an instrument in writing. 
A number of cases have been analyzed in each of 
which there was a suit brought or a claim rendered 
against an estate for personal services rendered over a 
long period of time and in which the application of a 
statute of limitations was rnade. One such is McFweeters 
v. Cecil, 177 Okla. 454, 60 Pac. 2d 801. That case was 
an action against an administrator for services rendered 
for thirteen years at the rate of $100.00 per year and for 
an additional eight years at the rate of $250.00 per year. 
The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's right 
was limited to recovery within three years next preceding 
the death of the deceased. This was the principal ques-
tion involved on the appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court found that cases on this general subject fell into 
three categories: The first one applies the rule that 
the law implies a promise to pay for such services when 
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rendered and that a cause of action may be brought at 
any time during the course of their rendition and no 
recovery can be had therefore after the statutory period 
has run following the rendition of any such services; the 
second group was found to involve the situation where 
there was no mention of the period of time for which 
the services were to be rendered and no measurement 
of the compensation to be paid and that in those cases 
the employment would be regarded on a year to year 
basis with wages payable at that time; the third group 
of cases were found to involve employment where there 
is a single hiring with a fixing of the service to be 
rendered and the time when the compensation shall be-
come due as at the death of the employer or at some 
other fixed time in which case the services are to be con-
sidered continuous and the statute of limitations will 
not con1mence to run until the services bargained for 
have been completed. A Utah case classified in the third 
group is Gulvranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah 115, 222 
Pac. 590. This was an action for services rendered by 
a daughter to her mother commencing in 1908 and run-
ning continuously until 1922 with temporary intermis-
sions in 1915 and 1916. This court held that the mother 
was inflicted with an incurable ailment and that the 
daughter agreed to stay with her and take care of her 
until she should die. For this reason it was held that 
only one period of time was involved and that was from 
the cmnmencement of services until the death of the 
mother and that there were no periodic payments re-
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quired to be n1ade and that no suit could have been 
brought by the dau~hter for any services until the death 
of the nwther. 
By contrast, in the case at bar, the contract was ex-
pressly shown to be one on a monthly basis with board 
and room of $100.00 per month if the plaintiff is to be 
believed (and, of course, if the appellants are believed 
there was no n1oney at all owing to the plaintiff) and 
there certainly was no testimony that the plaintiff was 
to render services to the appellants until a certain speci-
fied time with an in1plication that there could be no :re-
covery of wages until that remote time had been reached. 
In Shuler vs. Corl, 39 Cal. App. 195, 178 Pac. 535, 
an action was brought to recover compensation for 
services rendered to the defendant over a long period 
of time. Prior to the employment the plaintiff had been 
working at a drugstore and the defendant in writing 
asked the plaintiff to render labor and services in gen-
eral housework "for as long a period as the plaintiff 
should choose to work for the defendant, whether a 
month or years." The court found that there was no 
specific agreement as to when the services should be 
paid for but the plaintiff alleged that she was promised 
that she would receive at least $30.00 a month in excess 
of the amount she had been receiving at the drugstore. 
The plaintiff worked for eleven years and then after 
some delay brought the action and. the statute of limita-
tions was pleaded. The court held that the facts estab-
lished a contract to continue for as long as both parties 
wanted it to and it could have been terminated at any 
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time, and that under these facts it was the only reason-
able construction "that the various sums of money which 
would become due to the plaintiff would accrue at the 
end of each month during the period of her employ-
ment" and held that the statute of limitations barred all 
claims for months earlier than the statutory period. 
In re Steuer's Estate, 77 Cal. App. 584, 247 Pac. 
211, action was brought for board and room and care 
furnished by the plaintiff to the deceased for 36 months 
for $70.00 per month and the accounting was protested 
by the heirs of the deceased under the claim that these 
charges were payable at a monthly rate and that the 
two year statute instead of the three year statute of 
limitations applied. The Supreme Court held: 
"Here the claim shows plainly on its face 
that it was a monthly charge for services rendered 
from November 27, 1920 to November 27, 1923. 
Because of this fact, it follows as of course that 
the portion of the claim covering services ren-
dered beyond the two year limitation of the stat-
ute are barred, and was improperly allowed by 
the administratrix and the probate judge." 
In re Porter's Estate, 110 Pa. Super. 27, 167 Atl. 
490, a claim was made against an estate for stenographic 
and general office services performed for a period in 
excess of six years. The court held that: 
"Where services of a very general character 
are rendered for a long continuous period of time 
and the rate of compensation is uncertain, the 
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statute of lilnitations bars a elaim representing 
wages earned in the perfor1nance of such services 
Inore than ~ix years before the filing of the account 
of the debtor·~ estate." 
The courts hold generally that where a contract 
for personal sf•nriees is indefinite or uncertain as to 
the rate of cmnpensation or the periods to be covered 
by a specific an10unt of compensation the statute of 
limitations is held to bar clain1 for compensation for 
the services after the statutory period has run following 
the rendition of any particular item or portion of such 
services. In re Koonce's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 539, 
161 Atl. 578; McConnell vs. Crocker, 217 S. C.334, 60 
S.E. 2d 673; Maxfield cs. Dertadian, 66 N.Y.S. 2d, 346; 
In re McCormick Estate, 8 N.Y.S. 2d, 179; Scott vs. 
Walker, 141 Texas 181, 170 S.W. 2d 718; Etchas vs. 
Orena, 127 Cal. 588, 60 Pac. 45. 
And it follows a fortiori that where the agreement 
calls for monthly or other periodic payments of com-
pensation the statute commences to run at the expira-
tion of any such month or other period and an action is 
barred on a claim for compensation for such month or 
other period after the statutory time has run fron1 the 
close of the month or other period. Such cases are 
McMillan vs. Miller, 108 Wash. 390, 184 Pac. 352; In re 
Bate's Will, 225 Wis. 564, 275 N.W. 150; Harris v. Whit-
worth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W. 2d 101. 
Just why the answer of the appellants pleads the 
statute of limitations as barring plaintiff's recovery 
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prior to February 23, 1946 does not appear, since the 
amended complaint was filed on February 14, 1950, but 
no contention will be made that the statute bars anything 
subsequent to February 14, 1946. The cases plainly hold 
that where services are rendered on a monthly basis 
the cause of action accrues at the end of each month 
and is barred with the running of the statutory period 
on each such item or monthly claim. 
It cannot be argued successfully that no prejudice 
resulted to the appellants through submitting the case 
to the jury for the entire period of time back to the 
middle of 1943 because the verdict of the jury was in 
excess of the amount recoverable if the plaintiff had 
been limited to going back to February 14, 1946. The 
plaintiff quit work in August 1949 according to the 
amended complaint (1) and the period of time from 
February 1946 to August 1949 inclusive would be 43 
months which at $100.00 per month would be $4300.00 
or less than the jury's verdict of $4500.00 without giving 
any credit for incidental moneys given to the plaintiff 
by the appellants, admitted to be $180.00 (1). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND PRE-
SUMED INSANITY. 
The first motion for new trial alleged discovery of 
evidence that the plaintiff was under a legal guardian-
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ship in the State of Oregon and was an incompetent 
person and an escapee from an Oregon mental hospital 
(17-18). The affidavit supporting this motion gave no 
specific infor1nation coneerning the insanity or confine-
ment in Inental hospital (19). 
But the second nwtion which was entitled •• ~lotion 
for X ew Trial and for Relief frmn Order Denying De-
fendants Prior :Motion for New Trial'' was more specific. 
It alleged incarceration in a state mental hospital in 
Pendleton, Oregon, and that Shields was an escapee and 
was incurably insane in the opinion of the medical doctor 
who was the superintendent (22-23, 25, 26). For in-
stance, the medical superintendent wrote in one letter, 
":Jir. Shields was still insane when he escaped from the 
hospital. In view of the long duration of his mental 
illness and lack of improvement, I would not anticipate 
that he would ever recover" ( 25). 
)k It, therefore, appears that these motions for new 
TI trial gave sufficient evidence for the court to assume 
,; that the plaintiff had been insane and had been com-
mitted to a mental hospital in Oregon with no indication 
that he would recover from his mental illness and re-
gain his competence. And in addition, it is presumed by 
the courts that established or adjudicated incompetency 
and particularly insanity continues until an adjudication 
of a change of status. Johnson 'l'S. Gustafson, 96 Kans. 
630, 152 Pac. 621; Johnson vs. Johnson, 124 Oregon 480, 
264 Pac. 842; In re Red ferns Estate, 64 Mont. 49, 208 
Pac. 1072; Roberts vs. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
Company, 93 Wash. 274, 160 Pac. 965; Witthoft vs. 
Commercial Development Company, 46 Idaho 313, 268 
Pac. 31. 
Whether adjudication of insanity 1n Oregon shall 
be accorded full faith and credit in Utah is a question 
of some doubt as the decisions of the various states are 
in conflict. See 28 American Juris prudence, Section 23 ; 
"Insane Persons" page 670. The weight of authority is 
said to, favor full faith and credit and is supported by 
the following cases, among others: Poorman vs. Carlton, 
122 Kans. 762, 253 Pac. 424; In re Easter, 191 Iowa, 
407 182 N.W. 217. See also 44 C.J.S. "Insane Persons" 
Section 32 d, page 92. The giving of full faith and credit 
to adjudications of insanity by the sister states seems 
to be required by Section 102-13-49 U.C.A. 1943 which 
recognizes both non-resident guardians and non-resident 
wards having property in this state. 
Great importance mu~t be attached to the issue of 
insanity. If Shields was insane he had no power or 
capacity to commence this action, under Section 104-3-6 
U.C.A. 1943 which provides: 
"When an infant or an insane or incompetent 
person is a party, he must appear either by his 
general guardian, or by a guardian ad liten ap-
pointed in the particular case by the court, or 
judge thereof, in which the action is pending." 
The statute was held to apply to both resident and 
non-resident persons in Schuyer vs. Southern Pacific 
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Company. 37 Utah 5Sl, 109 Pae. -t-58. The cases hold 
simply that an incompetent person cannot maintain a 
suit in his own nan1e. PaTish vs. Ri.rJell, 183 Ga. 218, 
lSS S.E. 15, 107 A.L.R. 1385; Lindrrlwld vs. WalkeT, 
102 Kans. 5:28, 171 Pac. 603: Chavennes vs. Priestly, 
80 Iowa 316, -!5 X. \V. 766, 9 L.R.A. 193; State e.r rel: 
Yilek vs. Johlick, 66 !(an~. 301, 71 Pac. 572; 28 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, pages 737-738 and 735. 
Another ilnportant effect of insanity is that the 
plaintiff was not cmnpetent to testify. Section 104-49-2 
(1) U.C.A. 1943 specifically provides that among those 
who cannot be witnesses are "those who are of unsound 
mind at the ti1ne of their production or examination." 
See Hull vs. Lullough, 190 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270, 58 Am. 
Rep. 405 ; and 58 American Juris prudence, pages 92-94. 
Furthermore, if Shields was insane his contracts, 
including the contract sued upon in this case would have 
been void. 28 American Juris prudence 695. 
Because of all of these effects of the adjudication 
of insanity a new trial should have been granted so that 
the bearing of insanity on this entire case could have 
been considered both as it involves institution of the 
action, the capacity of the plaintiff to enter into a con-
tract, and his competence to testify. It is apparent that 
the course of a new trial would have been vastly differ-
ent from the one which resulted in the verdict forming 
the basis of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court cannot modify the judgment because it 
cannot be determined whether the jury awarded a ver-
dict on the theory of an express contract or quantum 
meruit, and if appellants' appeal is sound in any par-
ticular a new trial must be granted. 
The case should have gone to the jury to determine 
the terms of the express contract between the parties 
and recovery should have been limited to four years 
prior to commencement of the action. Having dismissed 
the second count at the close of plaintiff's case, the court 
should not have reinstated it without giving appellants 
opportunity to offer evidence thereon. And the pre-
sumptive insanity of the plaintiff requires that the trial 
court now determine his sanity during the working period 
and at the time of suit and determine therefrom whether 
the plaintiff, now deceased, had capacity to contract, to 
litigate or to testify. 
Appellants submit that all four of the points urged 
are sound and require reversal of the judgment of the 
district court as originally entered and in denying the 
motion for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS & BIRD 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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